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DNA as a power tool in hybrid warfare

The interdisciplinary research project Greyzone Genomics focuses on analysing the likelihood of new hybrid warfare methods based on genetic technology emerging in the near future.

The planting of synthetic DNA, biometric extortion, and genetic hybrid warfare are some of the risks that have arisen as a result of advances in genetic technology. But how dangerous is this development, and how great is the risk of new forms of hybrid threats engineered using genetic technology? These are the questions a group of researchers in the Greyzone Genomics project have investigated.

“We have explored new interdisciplinary methods to assess risks associated with emerging biotechnology,” says David Gisselsson Nord, Coordinator of the project and Professor as well as Senior Consultant in pathology at Lund University.

Scenario analysis for risk assessment from different perspectives

The researchers have based their work on different scenarios, analysing security risks from their respective fields of expertise and developing countermeasure proposals. The project includes experts in law, intelligence analysis, information warfare, medicine, and bioinformatics.

“We are trying to look at the full spectrum—can antagonistic actors use genetics to determine how a leader reacts under stress, and if so, how would that work?”

As an example, he refers to French President Emmanuel Macron’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2022. This took place during the COVID-19 pandemic, and Macron had declined to take a Russian COVID test before the meeting. According to the Kremlin, this was because Macron did not trust Russian COVID tests enough to take the test. rumours suggested that the French delegation feared Russia might gain access to Macron’s DNA if he underwent Russian testing.

As an example, he refers to the French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2022, where they sat on opposite sides of a 2.5-meter-long table. This took place during the COVID-19 pandemic, and Macron had declined to take a Russian COVID test before the meeting. According to the Kremlin, this was because Macron did not trust Russian COVID tests enough to take one. However, there were also rumors that the French delegation feared Russia might gain access to Macron’s DNA if he took the Russian test.

“Let’s say Russia had managed to steal Emmanuel Macron’s DNA. What could they have done with it? Could they, for example, develop a targeted virus to incapacitate Macron?”

Theoretically, perhaps, but it remains more myth than reality, says David Gisselsson Nord.

“It would require an enormous amount of work and likely wouldn’t be worth the effort.”

However, Emmanuel Macron’s DNA could be used to predict which diseases he might develop in the future—information that a hostile power could exploit. Through international databases, it is also possible to determine whether he has children or unknown relatives he is unaware of, as well as information about his ancestry.

DNA profiling and artificial DNA

The question of whether artificial DNA can be planted to falsely implicate someone in a crime has also been discussed within the project group. To do this, one would need to create synthetic DNA molecules in a laboratory that mimic a real person’s DNA and then plant them at a crime scene. The researchers argue that while this is complicated, it is not impossible.

Another aspect of DNA profiling concerns genetic weapons designed to target specific ethnic groups or minorities. If a group’s genetic profile is known, their genetic vulnerabilities could potentially be exploited in targeted chemical and biological weapons.

“However, we do see a great deal of myth-making and overestimation of the existence of genetically targeted bioweapons in the near future. Too many technical and scientific factors would need to align for this to be feasible on a large scale—at least for now,” says David Gisselsson Nord.

Intelligence and influence operations

Today, the most realistic uses of genetic technology lie primarily within the intelligence sphere.

“Actively collecting DNA to profile an opponent or to obtain information that can be used in negotiations is a tangible possibility. Narratives about the existence of biological weapons are also a frequent component of Russian disinformation campaigns,” says Oscar Larsson, Associate Professor in political science at the Swedish Defence University.

Peacetime, grey zone, and war

The researchers’ scenario analyses consider three different situations—peacetime, grey-zone scenarios, and war.

“We work across the entire spectrum to raise awareness of what could happen,” says Oscar Larsson.*

Understanding potential developments in both the short and long term is also essential for investing in the right countermeasures.

“By estimating actual risks and identifying warning signs, we can allocate resources where they are needed most,” says David Gisselsson Nord.

Spreading awareness of future threats

One of the challenges of the project has been the ethical implications of the research—specifically, the concern that analysing future hybrid threats could inadvertently provide malicious actors with new and effective hybrid warfare methods.

“We have had many discussions about whether we should disclose what we find in databases and how this information could be used for extortion or other purposes. We have settled on a formal security framework and compromises. For example, we plan to publish data in a masked format to prevent misuse,” says David Gisselsson Nord.

“By avoiding technical precision, we do not risk to contribute to the creation of new hybrid threats or weapons. However, we can still raise awareness of potential threats so that countermeasures can begin to be developed. That is more valuable than remaining silent,” says Oscar Larsson.

They also point out that hybrid warfare often relies on the element of surprise.

“By exposing potential threats and raising awareness, we deny adversaries that advantage,” says Oscar Larsson.

Evidence-based risk assessment of genetic technology in international conflict

The Greyzone Genomics research project concludes with a public lecture and panel discussion at the Swedish Defence University on 7 May. Learn more and register by 23 April.

More information about the Greyzone Genomics research project is available on Lund University’s website.

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Published:
2025-03-31
Last updated:
2025-03-31

Contact

Oscar Larsson

Associate Professor, Senior Lecturer

Oscar.Larsson@fhs.se +46 8-55342591
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